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Abstract 
 
Government-issued longevity bonds would allow longevity risk to be shared 
efficiently and fairly between generations. In exchange for paying a longevity risk 
premium, the current generation of retirees can look to future generations to hedge 
their systematic longevity risk. Longevity bonds will lead to a more secure pension 
savings market, together with a more efficient annuity market. By issuing longevity 
bonds, governments can aid the  establishment of reliable longevity indices and key 
price points on the longevity risk term structure and help the emerging capital market 
in longevity-linked instruments to build on this term structure with liquid longevity 
derivatives. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Longevity bonds pay declining coupons linked to the survivorship of a cohort of the 
population, say 65-year-old males; for example, the coupon payable at age 75 (i.e., 10 
years after the issue date of the bond) will depend on the proportion of 65-year-old 
males who survive to age 75; they have no principal repayment. They are designed to 
hedge systematic (also known as aggregate or trend) longevity risk. 
 
Insurance companies and pension plan providers face the risk that retirees might on 
average live longer than expected.  Longevity risk is a substantial risk that might 
adversely affect both the willingness and ability of financial institutions to supply 
retired households with financial products to manage wealth decumulation in 
retirement.  In this paper, we explain how governments issuing longevity bonds can 
act as a catalyst to facilitate the transfer of a proportion of this risk to the capital 
markets.  We highlight the benefits that would flow from a transparent and liquid 
capital market in longevity risk, and we argue that there is an important role for 
governments to play in helping this emerging market to grow.  We also show how the 
government might consider how to price longevity bonds in the face of potential 
demand from defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) plans and from 
annuity providers. Our line of reasoning comes from working in the UK, but we 
believe that what we argue here has validity for all countries with mature funded 
pension systems.  
 
The UK pension fund industry is the second largest in the world by value, with assets 
of around 20% of those held in the USA. However, the UK lifetime annuity market is 
much larger than in the US – around 500,000 annuities are set up each year at a cost 
of £12bn, mainly as a result of the effective requirement to buy life annuities as part 
of DC pension plan provision.   
 
A well-functioning annuity market will become increasingly important as DC plans 
mature, not just in the UK, but in all countries where DC pension provision becomes 
the norm. The importance of DC pensions and, in turn, lifetime annuities is growing 
rapidly as governments cut social security pensions and companies move away from 
DB plans. DC plans have to work effectively if people are going to be prepared to 
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save privately for their pensions.  However, a growing weakness in DC plans is the 
inability of annuity providers to hedge the systematic longevity risk they face. 
Systematic longevity risk might affect the price and availability of annuities, as well 
as insurance company solvency. Every country with DC pension plans will sooner or 
later have to confront the problem of dealing with systematic longevity risk. 
 
We therefore believe that the time is right for governments to set up a working party 
to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of the government issuance of longevity bonds.  
 
II. What is longevity risk? 
1
Figure 1: Decomposition of longevity risk
Total longevity risk 
= 
Systematic longevity risk
[Trend risk]
+
Specific longevity risk
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Private sector
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Figure 1 shows that longevity risk is driven by two underlying risks: random variation 
risk and trend risk. Random variation risk is the risk that individual mortality rates 
differ from the outcome expected as a result of chance – some people will die before 
their life expectancy, some will die after.1 Trend risk is the risk that unanticipated 
changes in life-style behaviour or medical advances significantly improve longevity.2
                                                 
1
 The mortality rate for a given age measures the frequency of occurrence of deaths of people of the 
given age in a defined population during a specified time interval, typically one year. Mortality rates 
are derived from crude death rates which are calculated as the ratio of deaths to the exposed population, 
i.e., the number of lives at the start of the period exposed to the risk of dying during a specified time 
interval, typically one year. A survivor (or survival) rate for a given age measures the proportion of 
people of the given age surviving a specified time interval. The survivor rate at age 65 equals (1 – 
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Private-sector institutions can deal with a ‘specific risk’ like random variation risk by 
pooling and relying on the law of large numbers to reduce the variability of this risk. 
Trend risk, on the other hand, is, like inflation risk, a ‘systematic risk’ that cannot be 
diversified away by pooling3
 
 and, indeed, the more business an insurer pools, the 
bigger the relative impact of trend risk. The private sector is unable to hedge this risk 
effectively without a suitable hedging instrument. We will argue that there is a key 
role for governments to help the private sector by issuing longevity bonds  –  
particularly by issuing bonds that provide ‘tail risk’ protection against trend risk – and 
by helping with the construction of national longevity indices.  
 
III. Why should we be concerned about longevity risk and who bears it?   
 
Longevity risk is borne by every institution making payments that depend on how 
long individuals are going to live. These include DB pension plan sponsors, insurance 
companies selling life annuities and governments through the social security pension 
system and the final salary pension plans of public-sector employees. The situation is 
particularly acute for insurance companies operating in the European Union (EU) 
where a new regulatory regime, Solvency II, is due to be introduced in 2014.4
 
 The 
current Solvency II proposals, if adopted, will require insurers to hold significant 
additional capital to back their annuity liabilities if longevity risk cannot be hedged 
effectively or marked to market. 
                                                                                                                                            
mortality rate at age 65). Life expectancy measures the average number of years a person of a given 
age would live under a given set of mortality conditions. Life expectancy is usually computed on the 
basis of a life table showing the probability of dying at each age for a given population according to the 
age-specific death rates prevailing during a specified period. For example, life expectancy at 65 = 0.5 + 
(1-q(65)) + (1-q(65))*(1- q(66)) + (1- q(65))*(1- q(66))*(1-q(67)) + ...+ (1-q(65))* ... *(1-q(120)) and 
q(120) is typically set to unity and q(65) is the mortality rate at age 65, etc. We also need to distinguish 
between period life expectancy which makes no allowance for future improvements in mortality rates – 
and so assumes, for example, that q(67) in the above formula will equal the mortality rate of today’s 
67-year-olds – and cohort life expectancy which makes such an allowance – and hence will involve a 
lower q(67) than used to calculate period life expectancy.  
2
 Factors such as obesity and environmental degradation could eventually lead to a trend decline in life 
expectancy.    
3
 Milevsky et al. (2006) prove this result. 
4
 See Appendix A for more details about Solvency II.  
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By any measure, longevity risk is a significant risk. Global private-sector pension 
liabilities are of the order of $25trn.5  In the UK alone, private-sector DB pension 
liabilities equal £1,340bn, while DC pension assets amount to £737bn (including 
£150bn in annuities with insurance companies).6 It has been estimated that every 
additional year of life expectancy at age 65 adds around 3 percent or £33bn to the 
present value of DB pension liabilities in the UK, with a similar impact on lifetime 
annuities.7 The most recent estimates for UK state pension liabilities were £3,843bn 
in respect of social security pensions, £852bn in respect of the unfunded pension plans 
of public-sector employees, and £313bn in respect of the funded plans of public-
sector employees (principally local government employees).8 This implies that UK 
government-backed longevity-linked liabilities exceed £5trn.9
 
 
In addition to being extensive, longevity risk in the private sector is beginning to 
become concentrated, especially in the UK. Private-sector companies in the UK are 
moving rapidly away from DB pension provision. They are beginning to offload the 
legacy longevity risk that they still hold either by buying-in annuities from life 
companies to cover their pensions-in-payment or by undertaking bulk buy-outs of 
their liabilities, again with life companies.10,11
 
 In providing these indemnification 
solutions for DB pension plans, insurance companies are beginning to play a big role 
in aggregating longevity risk in the economy. 
The DB plans in private-sector companies in the UK are being replaced with 
occupational DC plans – the equivalent of 401(k) plans in the USA – and, in so doing, 
                                                 
5
 OECD (2011) and Life and Longevity Market Association  
6
 Levy (2012) and Association of British Insurers; the figures are for end-2010. 
7
 Pension Protection Fund and the Pensions Regulator (2006, Table 5.6).  
8
 Hobbs (2012); the figures are for end-2010. 
9
 The UK government has linked the social security pension age to increases in life expectancy and is 
planning to do the same for public sector employees, so this figure is not expected to increase in future 
as it has in the past. 
10
 Bulk-buyouts transfer the pension liabilities in corporate pension plans to insurance companies. This 
market began in earnest in the UK in 1999, when the Prudential Assurance Company did £1bn of 
business.  
11
 There is also an increasing use of longevity swaps provided by both insurance companies and 
investment banks (Hymans Robertson, Buy-outs, Buy-ins and Longevity Hedging (various issues)). A 
longevity swap exchanges fixed for floating survivor rates over the tenor of the swap. The fixed rates 
might be set equal to the expected rates in Figure 2 below plus the longevity risk premium. The floating 
rates are the realized rates which could be above or below the fixed rate. Each year, the pension plan or 
annuity provider pays the fixed rate and receives the floating rate and thereby locks in the cost of the 
pension or annuity payments. The first suggestion for longevity swaps – or survivor swaps – was made 
in Dowd et al. (2006).   
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companies are passing the longevity risk back to their employees. So individuals 
should be concerned because there is a real risk that they will outlive their wealth – 
this is the specific risk identified in Figure 1 – if they do not hedge this risk by buying 
life annuities. In countries such as the UK and Chile where annuitization of DC 
pension pots is either mandatory or strongly incentivized, it will again be life 
companies that provide these annuities.  
 
So all the trends in pension provision – increasing demand from DB plans to use 
annuities to back their pensions in payment, the growing demand from DB plans for 
bulk buy-outs, the overall growth in both the number and size of DC pension funds 
and the associated growth in the number of pensioners with DC funds reaching 
retirement – are pointing to a big increase in demand for annuities provided by 
insurance companies.  
 
There are two problems associated with this increased demand. First, there is the 
danger that this could result in an unhealthy concentration of risk amongst a small 
number of insurance companies. Second, there is insufficient capital in the 
insurance/reinsurance industry to deal with total global private-sector longevity risk.  
 
Under Solvency II, it is proposed that insurance liabilities are increased by the 
addition of a market value margin (MVM) reflecting the cost of capital to cover ‘non-
hedgeable’ risks. For annuity companies this is principally longevity risk. It is 
currently proposed that in the absence of a hedging instrument for longevity risk, EU 
insurers will have to charge a 6% cost of capital above the risk-free rate when 
calculating the MVM. As a consequence of the long-dated nature of annuities, this 
calculation could result in the amount of capital held for longevity risk approximately 
doubling from current levels. The resultant extra capital for longevity risk and other 
Solvency II impacts12 would have to be passed on to customers and the money’s 
worth of annuities could fall by up to 10%.13
 
  
                                                 
12
  For example, the loss of upfront allowances for the liquidity premium and for credit risk. 
13
 Tully (2011). Of this 10%, industry insiders estimate that 7% is accounted for by the lost allowances 
for the liquidity premium and for credit risk, with the remaining 3% due to the absence of a longevity 
risk hedge. With £12bn annual sales of annuities in the UK, this implies a cost to every new annual 
cohort of retirees in the UK alone of £360mn.  
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The only realistic way of handling the issues of concentration and sufficient capital,  
is to find an efficient way or passing some of the risk onto governments and the 
capital markets. The alternative is poorer value annuities, an annuity market prone to 
insolvency or, in the extreme, no private-sector annuity market at all. All governments 
that have encouraged the growth of DC pension provision should be concerned about 
this. But, by issuing longevity bonds, governments can help to overcome these 
problems.  
 
IV. How can longevity bonds hedge systematic longevity risk? 
 
In order to see how a longevity bond can hedge systematic longevity risk, we need to 
both quantify longevity risk and identify where it is concentrated. Figure 2 presents a 
survivor fan chart14 derived using the Cairns-Blake-Dowd (CBD) stochastic mortality 
model.15 The fan chart shows the uncertainty surrounding projections of the number 
of survivors to each age from the cohort of males from the national population of 
England and Wales who are aged 65 at the end of 2006.16
 
 The bars indicate the 90% 
confidence interval on the projected survivor rate for each age out to 115. The line in 
the middle of each bar indicates the expected proportion of the cohort to survive to 
each age. The Figure shows that there is little uncertainty out to age 75: we can be 
fairly confident that approximately 19% will have died by 75. The uncertainty peaks 
at age 93: the confidence interval band is widest at this age. The best estimate is that 
36% will survive to age 90, but it could be anywhere between 30% and 41%. This is a 
very large range. The Figure also shows the extent of the so-called ‘tail risk’ after age 
90: there is some probability – even if small – that some members of this cohort will 
live beyond 110. 
                                                 
14
 Blake et al. (2008).  
15
 Cairns et al. (2006). This model is briefly explained in Appendix B. 
16
 The CBD model was estimated using data between 1991 and 2006. The historical period over which 
a stochastic mortality model such as the CBD model is estimated is certainly important for both getting 
a good fix on the future trend improvements in mortality rates and on their volatility around this trend. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that a longer data period is better. If there has been a 
significant change in the trend, then this suggests the model should be estimated over a short period for 
the purpose of getting a reliable estimate of the latest trend. On the other hand, a longer period might be 
used to get an estimate of long-run volatility. This is a matter of experimentation. The results we 
present here are purely illustrative, although they were compared for with consistency with the official 
Office for National Statistics 2008 projections. Much more analytical work would have to be done 
using a wider range of models before a real-world longevity bond could be issued.  
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A survivor fan chart is very useful to a pension plan or annuity provider since it shows 
the likely range of pensioners or annuitants from a given birth cohort surviving to 
each age. If more survive to each age than was expected, the pension plan or annuity 
provider has to make higher total pension or annuity payments than was anticipated. 
The opposite holds if fewer survive to each age than was anticipated. The best 
estimate expectation of life is 20.5 years; the 5% confidence level expectation is 19.4 
years and the 95% confidence level expectation is 21.8 years.  
 
We will now show how a longevity bond with the following characteristics can help 
to hedge systematic longevity risk: • The bond pays coupons that decline over time in line with the actual mortality 
experience of a cohort of the population, say 65-year-old males from the 
national population: so the coupons payable at age 75, for example, will 
depend on the proportion of 65-year-old males who survive to age 75. • Coupon payments are not made for ages for which longevity risk is low: so, 
for example, the first coupon might not be paid until the cohort reaches age 75 
(such a bond would be denoted as a deferred longevity bond). • The coupon payments continue until the maturity date of the bond which 
might, for example, be 40 years after the issue date when the cohort of males 
reaches age 105. 
Figure 2: Survivor fan chart - Males aged 65 
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• The final coupon incorporates a terminal payment equal to the discounted 
value of the sum of the post-105 survivor rates to account for those who 
survive beyond age 105. The terminal payment is calculated on the maturity 
date of the bond and will depend on the numbers of the cohort still alive at that 
time and projections of their remaining survivorship. It is intended to avoid the 
payment of trivial sums at very high ages. • The bond pays coupons only and has no principal repayment. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the possible range of coupon payments on a deferred longevity bond 
based on the national population of English and Welsh males who were aged 65 at the 
end of 2006.  Such a bond would provide a hedge for the systematic longevity risk 
faced by pension plans and annuity providers. If population survivorship is higher at 
each age than was expected, the bond pays out higher coupons. This is what pension 
plans and annuity providers need to help match the higher than expected pensions and 
annuity payments they need to make. If, on the other hand, survivorship is lower at 
each age than was expected, the bond pays out lower coupons. But the pension plans 
and annuity providers are not likely to mind this, since their pensions and annuity 
payments are also likely to be lower. 
0
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Figure 3: Deferred Longevity Bond for male aged 65 with 10-year 
deferment
Longevity Bond payable from age 75 with terminal payment 
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However, it is important to recognize that the bond will only provide a perfect hedge 
for the systematic longevity risk faced by pension plans and annuity providers if the 
plan members and annuitants have exactly the same mortality experience over time as 
the cohort underlying the bond. If the plan members and annuitants have a mortality 
experience that differs from that of the national population, this will introduce basis 
risk.17
 
  In practice, there will always be some basis risk. One reason for this is that 
pension plans and annuity books have far fewer members than the national population 
and will therefore experience greater random variation risk than the national 
population and this is likely to cause the mortality experience of a sub-population to 
diverge from that of the national population over time, even if they have the same 
mortality profile at the outset.  
Another reason is that most pension plans and annuity books will not have the same 
mortality profile as the national population, even to begin with. There can be 
differences in age, gender and socio-economic composition. Different birth cohorts 
have different survivor rates to each age. While survivor rates to each age tend to 
increase over time, in line with the trend improvement in longevity, they do not do so 
uniformly: some birth cohorts experience faster improvements than others.18
 
 Females, 
on average, live longer than males. Professionals tend to live longer than white-collar 
workers who in turn tend to live longer than blue-collar and manual workers. But it is 
not simply the differences in life expectancies between these various groups that are 
important, it is unexpected changes in the trends in their survivorship experience that 
causes basis risk.  
Yet another reason for basis risk involves the difference between ‘lives’ and 
‘amounts’. A population longevity index19
                                                 
17
 This is the risk that the ‘underlying’ – in this case, the survivor rates of the particular population 
being hedged – does not move in line with the hedging instrument – which, in this case, depends on the 
survivor rates of the national population.  
 will weight each life equally, but members 
of the higher socio-economic groups will tend to have higher pensions and annuities 
than members of the lower socio-economic groups. They are also more likely to have 
multiple annuities. The directors of a small manufacturing company are likely to 
18
 Willetts (2004), Richards et al. (2006).  
19
 This is an index based on the mortality experience of the national population. 
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represent a large share of the company’s pension plan liabilities and are more likely to 
live longer than the average member. All these factors will increase basis risk and its 
complexity.  
 
In theory, there could be a longevity bond for both males and females, for each age 
and for each socio-economic group. Such granularity of the longevity bond market 
would allow a high degree of hedge effectiveness to be achieved. But it would also 
result in negligible liquidity or pricing transparency: the more bonds there are, the less 
trading there will be in each bond and the less frequently the bonds will be priced. As 
is the case in other markets – especially derivatives markets – a small number of 
suitably designed bonds should provide an appropriate balance between hedge 
effectiveness, liquidity and pricing transparency.20
 
 
Not only are longevity bonds useful for hedging systematic longevity risk once 
pensioners have retired, they could be used to hedge systematic longevity risk and 
long-term investment risk in the period leading up to retirement. A typical DC plan 
will use a life-style (or life-cycle) investment strategy. This involves a high weighting 
in equities and other growth assets in the early stages of the accumulation process in 
order to benefit from the equity risk premium. There is then a systematic switch to 
less volatile assets, typically long-dated fixed-income bonds, during the final stages of 
the accumulation process – the so-called glide path to retirement – in order to reduce 
the volatility of the lifetime retirement income secured at retirement.  While the fixed-
income bonds hedge the interest-rate risk in the purchase of an annuity,21 they do not 
hedge the longevity risk.22
 
   
Both interest-rate risk and longevity risk could be hedged along the glide path if plan 
members invested in a fund containing longevity bonds. This would give plan 
members greater certainty of income in the run up to retirement. This follows because 
the price of future lifetime annuities (at the member’s retirement date) should be 
                                                 
20
 See the discussion in section 8 of Blake et al. (2006). 
21
 Since annuity providers buy bonds to make the annuity payments, annuities are subject to interest-
rate risk. If interest rates fall, bond prices rise and this will reduce the amount of the annuity that can be 
paid from a given lump sum.  
22
 If longevity improves at a higher rate than that expected along the glide path, this too will reduce the 
amount of the annuity that can be paid from a given lump sum.  
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highly correlated with the value of this fund which will rise if longevity improves 
faster than expected or if long-term interest rates fall, and reduce if longevity  
expectations decline or interest rates rise. The fund might be a better way of providing 
income security from a DC pension plan at retirement than the alternative of 
purchasing deferred annuities, since the annuity provider might have to hold 
significant capital against the deferred annuities it sold (at least this is true in the UK), 
the cost of which would have to be passed onto the member. 
 
V. Why should the government issue longevity bonds? 
 
In principle, longevity bonds could be issued by private-sector organizations. It has 
been argued that pharmaceutical companies would be natural issuers, since their 
revenues are positively linked to survivorship: the longer people live, the more they 
will spend on medicines.23 While this is true, the scale of the demand for longevity 
bonds far exceeds conceivable private-sector supply from companies such as 
pharmaceuticals. Further, there would be significant credit risk associated with the 
private-sector issuance of an instrument intended to hedge a systematic risk many 
years into the future. In practice, we believe that the only realistic issuer of longevity 
bonds in scale is the government.24,25
 
  
We believe that there are three important reasons why the government should engage 
in sharing longevity risk with the private sector. It: 
 • has an interest in ensuring there is an efficient annuity market 
 • has an interest in ensuring there is an efficient capital market for longevity risk 
transfers 
 • is best placed to engage in intergenerational risk sharing, such as by providing 
tail risk protection against systematic trend risk.26
                                                 
23
 Dowd (2003). 
 
24
 The first suggestion for governments to do this was made in Blake and Burrows (2001). 
25
 See section X below for a critique of this view. 
26
 See Bohn (2012) for a formal model of intergenerational risk sharing in the face of shocks to labour 
productivity, return on capital and longevity. Bohn recommends governments should issue both wage- 
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A. An efficient annuity market for pensioners 
 
The government has an interest in ensuring there is an efficient annuity market, given 
its desire to encourage retirement savings in DC pension plans that rely on annuities 
to turn pension savings into guaranteed lifetime retirement income. If the private 
sector is unable to hedge systematic longevity risk, it increases the likelihood that 
insurance companies stop selling annuities or increase annuity prices which would 
reduce pensioner income in retirement.  
 
A consequence of the above is that governments might find themselves having to pay 
additional means-tested benefits to supplement pensioners’ incomes, as well as 
receiving lower income tax and expenditure taxes (such as value added tax in the UK) 
from pensioners due to their lower incomes.27
 
 This will, ceteris paribus, lead to 
higher taxes on the working population. This outcome will therefore not be popular 
with workers or pensioners. Further, workers are likely to reduce savings into DC 
pension plans. Those that do continue to save in DC plans will face even greater 
uncertainty about their prospective pension income, since an efficient private-sector 
annuity market might no longer be in existence when they retire. 
B. An efficient capital market for longevity risk transfers 
 
The capital markets have a key role to help ensure there is an efficient annuity market 
and to reduce concentration risk.  It can therefore also be argued that the government 
has an interest in ensuring there is an efficient capital market for longevity risk 
transfers. There are two areas where government support is required. 
 
First, the government can help with the construction of national longevity indices. It is 
for reasons of accuracy that longevity indices would most likely have to be based on 
national mortality data. A key component of the success of the new capital market 
                                                                                                                                            
and longevity-indexed bonds, since these would help to reduce both the mismatch between pension 
assets and liabilities and the pension fund’s dependence on corporate sponsors.  
27
 Many of the people buying annuities in the UK are also on means-tested benefits. Any reduction in 
annuity payments arising from more onerous capital requirements resulting from insurers being unable 
to hedge longevity risk will immediately increase means-tested benefits. 
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will be the timely publication of accurate and independently calculated longevity 
indices. The longevity indices would cover mortality rates, survivor rates and life 
expectancies for both males and females. 
 
Only the government has access to the information necessary to produce these indices 
on account of the legal requirement to report deaths and related information such as 
dates of death and birth and gender to an official agency, which in the UK is the 
General Register Office of Births, Marriages and Deaths.28 Further, only the 
government has access to the information needed to estimate the size of the exposed 
population. In the UK, this is currently derived from decadal censuses with annual 
updates between censuses based on reported deaths and estimated migration flows. 
However, the resulting estimates are not accurate enough at high ages. It is important 
to be able to track a cohort over time, particularly at high ages: the government is in a 
unique position to do this, since it makes social security pension payments to almost 
every old person and needs to keep good records to do this. While longevity indices 
based on social class would be useful, the social class of a deceased person is not 
recorded at the time of death and while attempts have been made to construct social 
class indices, based on factors such as zip code or post code, these lack the accuracy 
of national indices. A similar argument would hold for longevity indices based on 
amounts rather than lives.29
 
 
Second, the government can make an important contribution by issuing longevity 
bonds to facilitate price discovery, thereby encouraging capital market development.     
Longevity risk is not currently actively traded in the capital markets, so we do not 
have a good estimate of its market price or premium.30
                                                 
28
 The government will always have more refined information than the private sector as a result of data 
protection legislation. This legislation prevents the release of information that would allow an 
individual – even one who has died – to be identified. Mortality data will only be published in a 
sufficiently aggregated form  – in terms of date and location of death – that makes it impossible for 
specific individuals to be identified.   
 But if the government issued a 
small number of longevity bonds, this would help to establish and maintain the 
market-clearing ‘price points’ for longevity risk at key ages and future dates, and 
hence establish a market price for longevity risk. In other words, the bonds would 
29
 For an examination of longevity hedging using longevity indices, see Coughlan et al. (2011). 
30
 The longevity risk premium is paid by the longevity bond’s buyer to the bond’s issuer to remove 
systematic longevity risk. It therefore results in a lower coupon that the bond’s issuer has to pay the 
bond’s buyer for purchasing the bond, thereby lowering the effective yield on the bond.  
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help to establish the riskless term structure for survivor rates for ages above 65 for 
future years.31
 
 There is a clear analogy with the fixed-income and index-linked (TIPS 
in the US) bond markets. In these markets, the issue of government bonds helped to 
establish the riskless term structures for interest rates and inflation rate expectations, 
respectively, for terms out to 50 years or more. The private sector was then able to 
issue corporate fixed-income and index-linked bonds with different credit risks 
(AAA, AA, etc.) and establish credit term structures above the riskless benchmark 
curves.  
The longevity risk term structure is more complex than either the interest rate or 
inflation term structures, since it is two-dimensional – involving age as well as time –  
whereas the  latter are one-dimensional, involving only time. The longevity risk term 
structure is therefore a two-dimensional surface, rather than a line: cohorts move 
diagonally across the surface over time, getting one year older with every passing 
year, with some members of the cohort dying each year. This is demonstrated in 
Figure 4 which shows the cash flows on two deferred longevity bonds: one bond 
based on male lives from the national population aged 65 and one bond based on male 
lives from the national population aged 75. Each bond is specified by four dates: the 
birth year of the cohort being tracked (e.g., 1945), the issue date (e.g. 2010), the first 
payment date (e.g., 2020) and the last payment date (e.g., 2050).32
                                                 
31
 Currently, the survivor rates for future years are based on model projections, such as the CDB model. 
Figure 2 illustrates this for males aged 65 at the end of 2006. The theoretically fair price of a longevity 
bond could therefore be determined using the CBD model.  However, with a traded market in longevity 
bonds, a market view of future survival rates would replace model projections and the resulting price 
points would be used in determining the market price of the bonds. Pricing-to-market would replace 
pricing-to-model.   
 There is a 
corresponding mortality term structure for females, so longevity bonds are also 
identified by gender (M or F). 
32
 If a strips market in longevity bonds develops – as happens with fixed-income and index-linked 
bonds – then hedgers could buy the subset of the coupon payments that most closely meets their 
hedging requirements, rather than having to buy the whole bond.  In addition, if the individual coupons 
in Figure 4 are traded separately, this will allow more accurate determination of the price points for 
longevity risk along the diagonals of the longevity risk term structure.  
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The establishment of a market price for longevity risk would be particularly useful for 
EU insurance companies operating under Solvency II. The maximum longevity risk 
premium that an annuity provider would be willing to pay to buy a longevity bond 
would be related to the level of capital that the regulators agree can be released as a 
result of holding the longevity bond to back annuity liabilities.33
 
  
The establishment of price points will also help to facilitate the capital market 
development of longevity swaps and other longevity derivatives similar to the 
interest-rate and inflation swaps that developed in the fixed-income and index-linked 
bond markets. Market participants were able to use market interest-rate and inflation 
expectations rather than projections from models. The same would happen in the 
longevity swaps market. The longevity swaps market began to develop in the UK in 
2007-09 with eight publicly announced swaps involving six annuity providers and 
two pension funds. A number of global investment banks and reinsurers intermediated 
the deals – J.P. Morgan, Deutsche Bank, RBS, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs and 
SwissRe – and the longevity risk was passed through to investors – such as insurance-
                                                 
33
 It will also be related to the extent of the basis risk that remains unhedged and potentially the size of 
any illiquidity premium contained in the price of longevity bonds. If longevity bonds are not actively 
traded, investors will demand an illiquidity premium to hold them and the regulator might be reluctant 
to accept that the bonds’ prices can be used for mark-to-market pricing for capital release purposes. 
Figure 4: Longevity Bond cash flows across ages and time
Issue year of 
bond
Deferment 
period on bond
Payments on 
bond
AGE
BIRTH YEAR
YEAR
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linked securities (ILS) investors, hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds, family offices 
and endowments – attracted by a new asset class that is uncorrelated with traditional 
asset classes, such as equities, bonds and real estate.  
 
C. Intergenerational risk sharing  
 
The government is the only agency in society that can engage in intergenerational risk 
sharing on a large scale and enforce intergenerational contracts.34
 
 This is important, 
given that longevity risk is a risk that crosses a number of generations.  
This is how the intergenerational risk sharing operates. The government would 
receive a longevity risk premium by issuing longevity bonds.  In effect, the current 
retired population pays future generations an insurance premium to hedge its 
systematic longevity risk. If, in equilibrium, the risk premium is sufficient to ensure 
that the generation bearing the risk is adequately compensated, then each generation is 
treated fairly. The current generation of pensioners derives benefit from annuity 
companies being able to use government-issued longevity bonds to provide better 
value annuities. The premium that this generation pays for taking away the longevity 
risk is effectively the premium required to compensate the younger generations to 
whom the government is passing on the risk in the form of possible higher taxes to 
enable the government to continue paying pensions to members of the current 
generation who live longer than expected. 
                                                 
34
 In the private sector, long-term contracts can involve significant credit risk as mentioned above and 
collateralization can introduce significant frictional costs 
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A key role for government in this context is to provide a hedge for systematic 
longevity risk by offering tail risk protection against trend risk. Once the market for 
longevity bonds has matured, in the sense of producing stable and reliable price points 
in the age range 65-90, the capital markets can take over responsibility for providing 
the necessary hedging capacity in this age range using longevity securities and 
derivatives. All that might then be needed would be for the government to provide a 
continuous supply of deferred tail longevity bonds with payments starting from age 90 
in order to allow pension plans and insurers to hedge their tail risk.35
 
 Figure 5 
illustrates the cash flows on such a bond.  These bonds will be necessary on a 
permanent basis, since the capital that annuity providers would be required by the 
regulator to post in order to cover this risk would be very high in the absence of a 
close matching asset. The bonds are also necessary because the investors who have 
recently become interested in taking the other side of the longevity swaps market have 
no appetite for hedging long-duration tail longevity risk. 
 
 
                                                 
35
 Pension plans and annuity providers might still be willing to invest in government-issued longevity 
bonds covering the age range 65-90 if they are competitively priced compared with capital market 
hedges. 
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Longevity Bond payable from age 90 with terminal payment 
at age 105 to cover post-105 longevity risk
Figure 5: Deferred Tail Longevity Bond for male aged 65 
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VI. What is the potential demand for longevity bonds? 
 
The demand for longevity bonds is driven principally by the growth of DC pensions 
and the growing maturity of DB plans. The market in DB longevity risk management 
is new and there is a significant programme currently being implemented in the UK 
by investment banks and actuarial consultants to educate DB pension plan trustees 
and annuity providers about the benefits of longevity risk hedging. Although the 
investment banks have an incentive to talk up the market, the demand is genuine. We 
believe that the potential demand for longevity bonds is substantial.  
 
In the UK alone: of the £1.3trn in DB private-sector pension liabilities, around 
£600bn relate to pensions in payment; of the approximately £600bn in accumulated 
DC pension assets, £200bn relate to people over age 55; and insurance companies are 
committed to making annuity payments valued in excess of £150bn.  
 
We believe that a suitable initial issuance of longevity bonds (with 10-year deferment) 
by the UK government could be four bonds: LBM(65,75), LBF(65,75), LBM(75,85) 
and LBF(75,85).36 The size of each bond issue will depend, in part, on price and this 
will be considered in the next section. However, the total issuance is likely to be small 
in relation to the overall size of the government bond market and is unlikely to 
become a principal funding source for government.37
 
 Nevertheless, the issuance will 
have significant value, since it will improve the efficiency of the annuity market as 
well as providing a useful risk management tool for DB plans. 
VII. Pricing considerations  
 
Ultimately, the demand for longevity bonds will depend on their price. Demand will 
be higher the closer the government offers the bonds at true economic cost, i.e., 
charges a fair, but not excessive, longevity risk premium. It is right that the 
government seeks to charge a fair risk premium on longevity bonds because this 
                                                 
36
 LBM(65,75) is a longevity bond for males aged 65, with the first coupon paid at age 75, etc. 
37
 Total UK government bond issuance will exceed £700bn over 5 years as a consequence of the fallout 
from the 2007-08 Global Financial Crisis. 
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ensures intergenerational fairness. The expected cost of the longevity risk should be 
borne by those whose retirement incomes will be derived from the bonds.  
 
Some might argue that the government should seek to charge a risk premium in 
excess of the economic cost. For example, if, in a Solvency II world, insurance 
companies writing annuity business end up having to hold capital in excess of true 
economic levels, because they are unable to hedge longevity risk, then they might be 
prepared to pay a premium price for longevity bonds if, by doing so, they can reduce 
their capital requirements. This would obviously depend on the Solvency II treatment 
of longevity bonds and the capital reduction that the regulators would allow.  
 
It would be short sighted of governments to seek to exploit this arbitrage situation. If 
insurance companies can reduce their capital requirements closer to economic capital 
levels, then this should result in higher annuity values with the consequent benefits to 
government, pensioners and savers already highlighted. 
 
In addition, we also believe that it is most unlikely that the market for longevity bonds 
will develop if the government just focuses on insurers. The bonds will need to be 
priced to attract DB pension plans which do not currently face solvency capital 
requirements. DB plans which do not have a pressing need for a full buy-out using 
annuities (which will be subject to Solvency II capital via insurers) and which want to 
engage in risk management will only buy longevity bonds  if they believe they are 
priced fairly (and cheaper than longevity swaps and other derivative longevity hedges 
provided by the private sector).  So, if we want to ensure DB pension plans buy 
longevity bonds issued by the government, the government should not price them 
above AAA.  
 
Members in DC pension plans de-risking (i.e., life-styling or life-cycling) in the run 
up to their retirement also will have a choice between using long-dated bonds and 
longevity bonds and again many will be discouraged from using longevity bonds if 
the government looks to charge a mark-up beyond the fair price. Other investors, 
including investment banks, will also be discouraged from buying longevity bonds if 
they believe the longevity risk premium is excessive, because they will fear that the 
bonds will eventually fall in value to reflect their true economic cost. 
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So for the market in longevity bonds to take off, we believe they should be priced 
according to economic capital principles. The analysis below is intended to initiate the 
process of defining what is the fair economic price. Our intention is not to determine 
that price; rather it is to indicate one possible approach and the issues that need to be 
resolved for determining what the fair price might be. The approach we have adopted 
builds on the insurance industry ‘cost-of-capital’ method.38
 
  This determines a risk 
margin for capital above the best estimate of the value of the liabilities. The best 
estimate of the value of the liabilities in our model is derived from the median 
scenario and, at any point in time, is the present value of the expected future coupons 
on the bond from the median scenario discounted at the risk-free rate. The cost-of-
capital method involves four stages: 
• Determine the required credit rating for the bond. 
 • Project the longevity risk capital required for each year in the life of the bond 
to maintain the required credit rating. 
 • Multiply each annual capital requirement by a percentage cost of capital to 
give the cost of capital in money terms.  
 • Calculate the present value of each of these cost-of-capital amounts using a 
risk-free discount rate and sum to give the present value of the overall risk 
premium. 
 
The starting point for quantifying the minimum risk premium that the government 
should charge to ensure intergenerational fairness is to consider the notional level of 
capital it would need to hold to achieve at least a AAA rating. It is important to realize 
that the government will not actually hold this capital – unlike an insurer – but simply 
uses the notional required capital amount to calculate the cost of capital for each year 
of the bond’s life. To calculate this notional capital, we ideally need to use stochastic 
mortality and interest rate modelling to determine the amount of notional capital that 
                                                 
38
 Chief Risk Officer Forum (2008). See Appendix C for an explanation. 
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would apply throughout the duration of the bond to ensure the bond’s payments 
would be made with a continuing AAA level of confidence.  
 
Our first task is to derive the survival probability on AAA bonds. We assume a yearly 
survival probability of 0.9995 in the analysis below to reflect the high standard of 
security that would be associated with government-issued longevity bonds. This is 
marginally higher than the annualized 20-year survival rates on AAA bonds of 0.9991 
between 1970 and 2008 and 0.9994 between 1920 and 2008.39
 
  
We then used the CBD model to project 10,000 longevity scenarios for English and 
Welsh males aged 65 at the end of 2006 (as shown in Figures 2, 3 and 5) and these 
were, in turn, used to calculate 10,000 present values of the coupon payments on a 
range of different types of longevity bond. Table 1 shows the distribution of life 
expectancies for males aged 65 and 75 at the end of 2006, according to the CBD 
model and quantiles of the distributions of longevity bond present values, payable 
immediately (PV(65,65) and PV(75,75)), payable from age 75 (PV(65,75)), payable 
from age 85 (PV(75,85)) and payable from age 90 (PV(65,90) and PV(75,90)), 
respectively.40  For convenience, the median present value for each bond has been 
rescaled to £100 by adjusting the base coupon. A fixed risk-free discount rate of 4% is 
assumed throughout.41
 
 Further, no allowance is made for expenses and other 
operational risks, since we are looking to quantify the pure price of the risk premium 
for longevity. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39
 The desired survival probability could be higher if required. 
40
 Notice that the PV(65,90) bond is more volatile than the PV(65,75) bond which, in turn, is more 
volatile than the PV(65,65) bond. This is for precisely the same reason that a zero-coupon bond is more 
volatile than a coupon-paying bond with the same maturity: because the zero’s cash flows are more 
heavily concentrated towards the end of its maturity than a bond paying regular coupons, it has greater 
duration. 
41
 The explanation for the choice of a fixed risk-free discount rate of 4% is given in Appendix C.  A 
more sophisticated approach would stochastically model the risk-free term structure. 
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Table 1: Distribution of life expectancies and longevity bond present values 
 
Quantile e65 PV(65,65) PV(65,75) PV(65,90) e75 PV(75,75) PV(75,85) PV(75,90) 
  
                
0.005 18.77 94.68 88.02 60.36 10.96 93.28 79.06 66.04 
0.01 18.93 95.22 89.14 63.55 11.07 93.94 81.34 69.40 
0.025 19.17 95.97 90.81 68.42 11.20 94.81 83.82 73.22 
0.05 19.37 96.57 92.19 72.44 11.34 95.67 86.48 77.63 
0.5 20.51 100.00 100.00 100.00 12.03 100.00 100.00 100.00 
0.95 21.82 103.65 108.39 134.43 12.79 104.57 114.76 126.10 
0.975 22.07 104.34 109.98 141.43 12.94 105.37 117.62 131.67 
0.99 22.38 105.12 111.73 150.07 13.14 106.57 121.17 138.73 
0.995 22.57 105.63 113.03 155.36 13.28 107.31 123.87 143.24 
Mean 20.53 100.03 100.09 101.25 12.04 100.05 100.19 100.65 
  
                
Median annuity 
factor 12.619 5.222 0.675   8.420 2.106 0.815 
Base coupon (£) 7.925 19.149 148.133   11.876 47.493 122.730 
 
Notes: Derived from the CBD model estimated on English and Welsh male data for age 65 over the period 1991-2006. 
e65 and e75 = life expectancy at ages 65 and 75. PV(65,65) = present value of  a bond with base coupon of £7.925 for a 
male aged 65, payable from age 65. PV(65,75) = present value of  a bond with base coupon of £19.15 for a male aged 
65, payable from age 75.  PV(65,90) = present value of a bond with base coupon of £148.13 for a male aged 65, payable 
from age 90. The discount rate is assumed to be a risk free 4%. The median annuity factor is the present value of a base 
coupon of one unit payable yearly in arrears multiplied by the proportion of the cohort still alive at the end of each year, 
for the life of the annuitant from a given age. The base coupon is derived by dividing the median price of the bond (set 
as 100) by the median annuity factor. The actual coupon in each year a coupon is due is equal to the (rescaled) base 
coupon multiplied by the percentage of the population surviving between the bond’s issue date and the coupon payment 
date.  
 
 
We now need to determine the relevant quantiles of the distribution of present values 
to achieve a AAA rating. We do this at the undiscounted mean term of the expected 
payments.42
                                                 
42
 An alternative would have been to use the discounted mean term or duration of the bond. This, 
however, has the effect that it changes when the discount rate changes. This is inappropriate because 
the potential dispersion of projected cash flows, and hence the risk against which capital is being held, 
does not depend on interest rates. We did, however, examine the effect of using the discounted mean 
term with a fixed discount rate of 4% and it made very little difference to the final estimate of the 
longevity risk premium.  
 Table 2 shows the mean term on the issue date for a range of different 
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bonds. The corresponding AAA quantiles are shown in the last column. These are 
found by raising the survival probability of 0.9995 to the power of the mean term. 
 
Table 2: Mean term of longevity bonds and corresponding AAA quantiles on issue date of bonds 
Longevity bond Mean term AAA quantile 
LBM(65,65) 13.21 0.99341 
LBM(65,75) 19.73 0.99018 
LBM(65,90) 30.51 0.98486 
LBM(75,75) 8.72 0.99565 
LBM(75,85) 16.00 0.99203 
LBM(75,90) 19.87 0.99011 
Notes: The mean term is found by summing the expected coupons on a bond weighted by the number 
of years ahead each coupon occurs and then dividing by the sum of the expected coupons.  The 
corresponding AAA quantile is found by raising the survival probability of 0.9995 to the power of the 
mean term. For example, for the LBM(65,65) bond, the mean term is 13.21 years and the 
corresponding AAA quantile is 0.999513.21 = 0.99341. 
  
 
Using the information in Tables 1 and 2, we can determine the initial notional capital 
that is required for a AAA rating and then use this to calculate the cost of capital for 
each year of the bond’s life.  
 
Take, for example, the LBM(65,75) bond (i.e., one based on males age 65 with 
payments starting at age 75). On the issue date, the mean term is 19.73 years and 
therefore the AAA capital requirement can be derived from the 0.99018 quantile (see 
Table 2), giving an initial capital requirement of 11.73% (see Table 1 – the 0.99 
quantile is £111.73, while the median is £100). Figure 6 shows graphically the level 
of economic capital required for the first year. 
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For subsequent years, we continue to use the best estimate of the bond’s coupons 
from the median scenario. However, we need to re-run the CBD model to produce 
new sets of 10,000 scenarios for each year in the future. In doing this, we assume that 
mortality rates follow the best estimate path from the median scenario up to the year 
(and associated age) that we are modelling and then we produce a new stochastic 
distribution of outcomes using drift and volatility parameters consistent with the CBD 
model used in the first year.  
 
Although this results in a narrowing funnel of doubt as each year passes,43 the mean 
term of the expected cash payments also reduces and this requires higher quantiles of 
the distribution to be used each year to maintain the desired AAA credit rating for the 
bond.44
 
 The net outcome of these opposing effects results in a lower capital mark-up 
percentage over time. Table 3 shows a subset of the mean terms, the resultant AAA 
quantiles and the capital mark-up percentages for LBM(65,75) and LBM(75,85) that 
can be applied to the series of best estimate liabilities derived from the median 
scenario. 
                                                 
43
 As the age 65 and 75 cohorts grow older, the range of possible outcomes narrows.  
44
 This follows because 0.9995 raised to the power of a lower mean term produces a higher quantile 
than 0.9995 raised to the power of a higher mean term as Table 2 shows. 
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Figure 6: Distribution of 10,000 scenarios of the present values of  
10-year Deferred Longevity Bond payments for males aged 65
Longevity Bond with coupon of £19.15 adjusted for survivorship of age 65 cohort
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It is therefore possible using the CBD model to calculate the notional required AAA 
capital holdings for longevity risk for each year for any bond. We now need to 
multiply each one of these by the cost of capital and a risk-free discount factor and 
sum this series to produce the required risk premium which can be expressed as a 
percentage of the expected bond price of 100. We can then convert this to an effective 
basis points reduction from the risk-free rate.  
 
A critical factor in the process is to determine the appropriate cost of capital. This has 
been the subject of much debate in the run up to Solvency II:  annuity companies are 
currently expected to use a 6% cost of capital when calculating their MVM.  This is 
intended to cover a number of risk factors associated with annuity provision, the most 
significant being non-hedgeable longevity risk. However, the industry believes that 
this figure will lead to a SCR which will result in insurers being asked to hold capital 
above the true economic level.45 The industry has therefore recommended a cost of 
capital in the range 2.5%-4.5% p.a., based on the cost of non-hedgeable risks and a 
capital level calibrated to a 0.995 survival probability over one year.46
                                                 
45
 Chief Risk Officer Forum (2008, pp. 16-18). 
 This 
46
 Chief Risk Officer Forum (2008,  p. 8). See Appendix C for an explanation. 
Table 3: Mean term, AAA quantiles and resultant AAA capital as a percentage of best estimate 
liabilities 
 
  
 
LBM(65,75) 
 
 
LBM(75,85) 
 
Age Mean term Quantile Capital % Mean term Quantile Capital % 
65 19.73 0.99018 11.73%       
70 14.73 0.99266 11.31%       
75 9.73 0.99515 11.01% 16.00 0.99203 21.81% 
80 8.16 0.99593 10.34% 14.73 0.99266 20.70% 
85 6.76 0.99663 10.05% 9.73 0.99515 19.89% 
90 5.51 0.99725 9.66% 8.16 0.99593 18.31% 
95 4.44 0.99778 9.04% 6.76 0.99663 17.05% 
100 3.54 0.99823 8.52% 5.51 0.99725 15.82% 
105 2.82 0.99859 8.07% 4.44 0.99778 13.98% 
110 2.27 0.99887 7.57% 3.54 0.99823 12.90% 
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approximately translates into a cost of capital in the range 1.67%-3% p.a., based on a 
0.9995 annual survival probability.47
 
  
The upper end of this range is substantially higher than a government would be 
expected to charge. This is because the longevity risk faced by governments is lower 
than that faced by insurers because they have the benefit of having a more reliable 
estimate of current longevity exposures. They therefore have a more accurate starting 
point for modelling longevity improvement risk. They also face less random 
variability in trend improvements in longevity as government-issued longevity bonds 
will be based on national population data. By contrast, the population relevant for 
insurers is a small and much more volatile subset of the national population. A case 
could therefore potentially be made for government to use a cost of capital of around 
2%.48, 49
 
 
Table 4 shows the total risk premium for a number of longevity bonds for illustrative 
costs of capital of 2% and 3%. It also shows the corresponding basis points reductions 
from the risk-free rate. Take LBM(65,75) and a 2% cost of capital, for example. This 
bond has a total risk premium of 3.2%. This means that the issue price of the bond 
would be £103.20. The effective yield on the bond is equal to the risk-free rate less 
the basis points reduction, so the effective yield on LBM(65,75) is 3.821%.50
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47
 Chief Risk Officer Forum (2008, Figure1, p. 30). 
48
 This would include an allowance for model risk, e.g., in the model used to project future mortality 
rates. 
49
 An alternative approach to the cost-of-capital method used in this paper is the ‘percentile method’ 
which determines the level of capital needed to ensure that all payments can be met for a set percentage 
of all the scenarios. In the context of Solvency II, a probability of 75% has been suggested. By using 
the initial 10,000 present value scenarios from the CBM model, a 75 percentile risk premium can be 
determined and, in turn, an implied cost of capital can be calculated. In this case, the percentile method 
implies costs of capital of 2.11% for LBM(65,75), 1.75% for LBM(65,90) 2.77% for LBM(75,85) and 
2.45% for LBM(75,90). 
50
 By using a discount rate of 3.821%, the present value of the coupon payments on the LBM(65,75) 
bond equals £103.20. 
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Table 4: Risk premiums and basis points reduction in yield on  
longevity bonds 
 
Bond 2% cost of capital 3% cost of capital 
 Risk premium Bps reduction in 
yield 
Risk premium Bps reduction in 
yield 
     
LBM(65,65) 1.4% 13.4 bps 2.0% 20.0 bps 
LBM(65,75) 3.2% 17.9 bps 4.7% 26.5 bps 
LBM(65,90) 15.1% 48.7 bps 22.6% 70.8 bps 
      
LBM(75,75) 1.2% 16.5 bps 1.8% 24.7 bps 
LBM(75,85) 4.1% 27.6 bps 6.2% 40.8 bps 
LBM(75,90) 8.2% 42.6 bps 12.4% 62.2 bps 
Notes: The risk premium is the total for each bond. The basis points reduction shows the annual 
reduction from the assumed risk-free yield of 4%.  
 
 
VIII. Who benefits from government issuing longevity bonds? 
 
Who benefits from governments assisting in encouraging the optimal sharing of 
longevity risk? The simple answer is everyone. Everyone should benefit from having 
a market price for longevity risk and the ability to hedge systematic longevity risk. 
But there are also more specific benefits. 
 
The government: • Gains by having both a more secure DC pension savings market and a more 
efficient annuity market, resulting in less means-tested benefits and a higher 
tax take. • Should gain access to a new source of long-term funding which, by widening 
the investor base, lowers the cost of government issuance. • Is able to issue bonds with a deferred payment structure to help its current 
funding programme and improve its cash flow. • Earns a market-determined longevity risk premium thereby further reducing 
the expected cost of the long-term national debt. 
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For DB pension plans: • Have the opportunity to reduce longevity risks. • Can hedge longevity risk exposure prior to buy out. 
 
Insurers: • Can potentially establish a mark-to-market longevity risk term structure and 
hence hold the optimal level of economic capital or at least hold capital closer 
to the economic level. • Longevity bonds will help insurers to play an aggregating role in providing 
pension plans and individuals with longevity insurance, whilst being able to 
pass on a proportion of their risk to the capital market; this would reduce their 
longevity concentration risk and facilitate the spread of longevity risk around 
the capital markets. 
 
The capital markets: • Get help to kick start market participation through the establishment of 
reliable longevity indices and key price points on the longevity risk term 
structure. • Can build on this longevity risk term structure with liquid longevity 
derivatives. 
 
Investors: • Get access to a new (longevity-linked) asset class whose returns are 
uncorrelated with traditional asset classes, such as bonds, equities and real 
estate. 
 
Regulators: • A longevity risk term structure should help the insurers’ regulator (the 
Prudential Regulation Authority51
                                                 
51
 This replaced the Financial Services Authority in April 2013. 
 in the UK) validate insurers’ economic 
capital, thereby making regulation more robust. 
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• Longevity bonds should help an orderly transfer of longevity risk from DB 
plans to the capital markets, thereby reducing reliance on an uncertain sponsor 
covenant and reducing concentration risk amongst insurers, and, in turn, 
giving comfort to the pension plans’ regulator.   • A longevity risk term structure should help facilitate the calculation of any 
risk-based levy to a pension insurance plan (the Pension Protection Fund in the 
UK).52
 
 
Pension plan members: • DB pension plan members potentially get better security. • DC pension plan members get better valued annuities which produce a higher 
lifetime income when they retire. • Further, individuals with DC pension plans would have a means of hedging 
the longevity risk associated with purchasing an annuity at retirement.  
 
IX. Growing support for government issuance of longevity bonds 
 
Support for governments to issue longevity bonds is growing steadily, not only in the 
UK, where the situation is most immediate, but also internationally.  
 
The UK Pensions Commission suggested the government should consider the use of 
longevity bonds to absorb tail risk for those over 90 or 95, provided it exits from other 
forms of longevity risk pre-retirement which it has done by linking state pension age 
to increases in life expectancy and by raising the future state pension age from 65 to 
68 by 2046. “One possible limited role for government may, however, be worth 
consideration: the absorption of the ‘extreme tail’ of longevity risk post-retirement, 
i.e., uncertainty about the mortality experience of the minority of people who live to 
very old ages, say, beyond 90 or beyond 95.”53
 
 
                                                 
52
 The Pensions Regulator in the UK is responsible for the regulation of occupational trust-based DB 
and DC schemes and attempts to limit the number of DB schemes needing support from the Pension 
Protection Fund (which was based on the US Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation).    
53
 Pension Commission (2005, p. 229). 
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The UK Confederation of British Industry (CBI), which represents British employers, 
has argued: “Government should drive development of a market in longevity bonds, a 
similar instrument to annuities, by which the payments on the bonds depend on the 
proportion of a reference population that is still surviving at the date of payment of 
each coupon. This should be done through limited seed capital and supporting policy 
work on the topic. Government could also consider how best to match government 
bond issues to pension scheme needs, including the provision of more long-dated 
bonds and whether government should issue mortality bonds itself.”54
 
 
According to the OECD: “Governments could improve the market for annuities by 
issuing longevity indexed bonds and by producing a longevity index.”55
 
 
The World Economic Forum has argued: “Given the ongoing shift towards defined 
contribution pension arrangements, there will be a growing need for annuities to 
enhance the security of retirement income. Longevity-indexed bonds and markets for 
hedging longevity risk would therefore play a critical role in ensuring an adequate 
provision of annuities.”56
 
  
Finally, the IMF states: “Although the private sector will further develop market-
based transfer mechanisms for longevity risk if it recognizes the benefits of doing so,  
the government has a potential role in supporting this market. Measures could include 
provision of better longevity data, better regulation and supervision, and education to 
promote awareness of longevity risk. Those governments that are able to limit their 
own longevity risk could consider issuing a limited quantity of longevity bonds to 
jumpstart the market.” 57
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54
 Redressing the Balance - Boosting the Economy and Protecting Pensions, CBI Brief, May 2009. 
55
 Antolin and Blommestein (2007). 
56
 World Economic Forum (2009). 
57
  International Monetary Fund (2012). 
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X. Counter arguments  
 
While we feel we have put forward a number of strong arguments supporting the case 
for longevity bonds that are issued by governments, we do need to acknowledge and 
then address a number of counter arguments. 
 
First, concerns have been raised that governments are not natural issuers of longevity 
bonds because of their large existing exposure – in excess of £5trn in the case of the 
UK government – to longevity risk.   
 
We would argue that a government’s exposure to unanticipated longevity 
improvements through the issuance of longevity bonds is – or at least could be – well 
hedged. First, the government receives a longevity risk premium from issuing the 
bonds. Second, in the event that the risk premium proves to be insufficient, the 
government can reduce its state pension spend and increase its pre-retirement tax take 
by raising the state pension age, as recommended by the UK Pensions Commission. 
The next generation might have to work longer, but will, in any case, have ended up 
being a fitter generation than anticipated and so be able to earn more income which, in 
turn, will produce more tax. Third, since the issuance of longevity bonds should result 
in a more efficient annuity market and hence higher incomes in retirement, this should 
also result in an increase in the tax take and help to reduce the amount of means-tested 
benefits. In addition, it should be noted that the higher tax take and lower means-
tested benefits arising from a more efficient annuity market applies to the lifetimes of 
all pensioners buying an annuity, whereas the tail risk protection provided by deferred 
tail longevity bonds applies only to those surviving over 90, some 25 years in the 
future.  
 
Overall, once a government is only issuing deferred tail longevity bonds, the risk will 
be very manageable and consistent with the government’s role of facilitating 
intergenerational risk sharing. We believe that there could be a significant cost-benefit 
to the government from the issuance of longevity bonds and therefore a strong, indeed 
overwhelming, case for a government to issue longevity bonds.  
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The second criticism is that there is no role at all for a government in issuing 
longevity bonds as argued by Dowd (2003) and Brown and Orszag (2006).  
 
Dowd (2003) criticized the original argument used by Blake and Burrows (2001) to 
justify government issuance of longevity bonds (or what Blake and Burrows called 
survivor bonds), namely the appeal to the Arrow-Lind Theorem on social risk bearing. 
This theorem states that by dispersing an aggregate risk across the population (of 
taxpayers) as a whole, the associated risk premium on a longevity bond issued by the 
government would be lower than that charged by a private-sector issuer. Dowd 
countered that many of the assumptions underlying the theorem – such as taxes are 
costless to collect, each household bears an equal share of the tax burden, and an 
absence of distributional effects – do not hold in practice. Instead, he argued that 
capital markets are better suited than any government to bear and share risks, since 
they allow risks to be diversified internationally. In short, Dowd argued that 
government intervention was unnecessary, since private-sector parties were perfectly 
capable of creating and trading longevity-linked instruments and derivatives 
themselves. There was no market failure for the government to correct, rather the time 
is not yet ripe: “The fact that a particular innovation has not yet occurred does not in 
itself constitute an argument for government intervention to bring it about. Any good 
new idea, including that of survivor derivatives, should eventually take off –  but we 
have to give it time.... When the time is ripe, it is therefore entirely possible, and even 
likely, that markets for survivor derivatives – survivor bonds, forwards, futures, 
options and swaps, and annuity securitization – will take off, and eventually become 
as familiar as comparable instruments such as credit derivatives are today” (pp. 347-
8). 
 
Brown and Orszag (2006) also accept that a longevity risk premium would need to be 
paid in order to hedge aggregate longevity risk, but they argue that it is not 
sufficiently high to cause a market failure and hence justify government intervention: 
“we suspect that this risk does exert some upward pressure on annuity pricing, 
possibly in the range of a few percentage points” (p. 622).  They also accept that the 
intergenerational sharing of longevity risk can potentially improve social welfare.  
Suppose a scientific discovery improves the life expectancy of all current and future 
generations. Current 80-year olds would be unable to respond to this by re-entering 
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the labour market and hence would experience a lower standard of living as their 
remaining wealth would have to be spread over a longer period. Younger generations 
are more able to adjust to this mortality shock. Hence the financial risk from such a 
shock could be spread over a number of generations and this would improve social 
welfare. Since only the government is able to enforce intergenerational contracts, 
there is a potential role for the government in efficiently spreading risk across 
generations. However, Brown and Orszag believe that it is unlikely that the 
government will spread risk efficiently: “to maximize social welfare, it is not 
sufficient that the government move any amount of risk from the current generation to 
some other generation. Rather, the government needs to move the optimal amount of 
risk onto the right generations” (p. 625).  Instead, they believe that the government 
will favour the current generation of voters, and particularly the large number of vocal 
grey voters, over generations as yet unborn, by transferring “more than the optimal 
amount of risk to future generations” (p. 629).58
 
   
We would argue that there is a role for both government and the private sector in 
developing a longevity market. As discussed in Figure 1, the private sector is best at 
hedging specific longevity risk, once it has hedged systematic longevity risk. The 
government is the only agent in society with both the capacity and credibility to 
provide a long-term hedge for systematic longevity risk through the issuance of 
longevity bonds. While Dowd, Brown and Orszag highlight some of the difficulties 
associated with the government’s ability to forecast future mortality improvements, 
the existence of longevity bonds would provide an incentive for the government to 
collect better death records and improve its longevity forecasting techniques, both of 
which would have wider social benefits. Even if the private sector is better at 
forecasting than the government – which in this case is hard to believe since it is the 
government that collects death statistics – systematic longevity is a slowly building 
trend risk and the private-sector issuer of a longevity bond risks insolvency if it gets 
that trend wrong in a way that the government will its unlimited powers of taxation 
does not.   
                                                 
58
 Dowd (2003, pp. 346-7) makes the same point: “The intergenerational argument is open to the 
objection that governments have an incentive to put the interests of current voters ahead of those of 
future voters”.  We would argue that the issuance of longevity bonds would help to reduce this 
incentive. The current generation is getting its longevity risk insurance for free: if longevity bonds were 
issued, it would have to pay for it!   
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The third criticism is that even if longevity bonds are issued by the government, there 
is a question mark concerning the potential liquidity of the market trading longevity 
bonds. Some have argued that liquidity is likely to be thin, since any new information 
concerning mortality that would be sufficiently significant to motivate trading is 
likely to arrive very infrequently. While this is true, we believe that there are 
important lessons from the inflation-linked financial futures market. Early attempts to 
introduce such a market were initially unsuccessful but they eventually succeeded and 
inflation indices have similar characteristics to longevity indices, especially in their 
low frequency of publication.  
 
The first attempt occurred when CPI futures contracts were listed on the US Coffee, 
Sugar and Cocoa Exchange in June 1985. This contract was delisted in April 1987, 
with only 10,000 contracts ever having been traded. The key reasons for the failure of 
this contract were: there was no underlying inflation-linked securities market at the 
time, the underlying was an infrequently published (i.e., monthly) index, and there 
was no stable pricing relationship with other instruments to attract the attention of 
arbitrageurs. The second attempt occurred when Treasury inflation-protected 
securities (TIPS) futures were listed on the Chicago Board of Trade in June 1997 and 
subsequently delisted before the end of the year with only 22 contracts ever traded. 
The key reasons for the failure of this contract were: TIPS had only started trading 
five months before, there was just a single 10-year TIPS trading, the futures contract 
competed with the underlying for liquidity, and there was uncertainty over the future 
of the TIPS program. The final attempt was in February 2004 when the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange launched a CPI futures contract which is still trading. The 
reasons for the success of this contract are: inflation-linked securities have gained 
acceptance amongst investors, TIPs have evolved into recognized asset class, there is 
a well-understood pricing relationship allowing for arbitrage opportunities between 
TIPS, fixed-interest Treasury bonds and CPI futures, the US Treasury is committed to 
long-term TIPS issuance, CPI futures do not compete directly with but rather 
complement TIPS and use same the inflation index, and liquidity is enhanced by 
electronic trading on Globex. This experience therefore suggests that it is possible to 
create a liquid market in an instrument based on an infrequently published index. 
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The fourth criticism is that longevity bonds are unnecessary since the load in annuity 
prices is sufficiently large to a) absorb the increase in regulatory capital that will be 
required after the introduction of Solvency II in the absence of longevity bonds, and 
b) to absorb the longevity risk in countries not subject to Solvency II (e.g., the US and 
Australia). 
 
Our response is that there is limited scope for annuity providers to absorb either the 
costs of the additional capital requirements or the aggregate longevity risk without 
seriously reducing the money’s worth of the annuities they sell.59
 
 
The life annuity market in the UK has scale (a £12bn per annum market - around a 
half of the global annuity market) and as a consequence is price competitive with a 
number of life insurers competing for business. It is relatively easy for pensioners to 
compare the different guaranteed incomes on offer in exchange for their pension 
savings.  
 
In recent years, the money’s worth of the UK annuity market has been assessed and 
tracked by Professors Edmund Cannon and Ian Tonks. They were commissioned by 
the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) in 2009 to produce a detailed report on 
the money’s worth of annuities in the UK. Their report examines a time series of 
pension annuity rates in the UK for the period 1994 to 2007. “The report computes the 
money’s worth of annuities and finds that, on average, the money’s worth over the 
sample period for 65-year old males has been 90 per cent, and for 65-year old females 
has been a similar but slightly larger 91 per cent. Taking into account load factors 
associated with annuity contracts and in comparison with other financial and 
insurance products this implies that annuities are fairly priced.” (Cannon and Tonks 
(2009, xiii).  
 
                                                 
59
 The conventional methodology for valuing annuities is to calculate the ‘money’s worth’ statistic, 
which will equal 100% when annuity providers have no administrative costs and are making no profits.  
In practice, the money’s worth is typically less than 100 per cent due to the presence of administrative 
costs, risk charges (in form of cost of capital) and the need for annuity providers to make a ‘normal 
profit’. The sum of the costs and normal profit is called the ‘load factor’. 
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Cannon and Tonks’ analysis shows that there is some evidence that the money’s 
worth has fallen since 2002. They discuss a number of reasons for this, including: 
changes in insurance regulation, changes in industrial concentration, an insurance 
cycle, the pricing of mortality uncertainty, and the growth in the impaired lives 
market. The last of these is becoming an increasingly important factor in the UK and 
it has resulted in the money’s worth for standard annuities (i.e., those for healthy 
lives) falling as insurance companies have made allowance for the selection effects 
caused by the introduction of enhanced rates for pensioners with health impairments 
that reduce their expected life expectancy. Around 30% of pensioners qualify for 
enhanced annuity rates and life insurers have adjusted the rates on standard annuities 
to reflect the longer life expectancy of the 70% buying standard annuities. The other 
main reason is that UK insurers have increased the loading for the cost of their risk 
capital to reflect the fact that they expect to have to hold more capital in a Solvency II 
world. This trend has accelerated since 2009 as the introduction of Solvency II comes 
nearer. In short, the load in annuities cannot take much more strain without adversely 
impacting the size of the annuity payments.  
 
The fifth and final criticism that we consider is that basis risk is sufficiently large that 
it would negate any gains from holding longevity bonds.  
 
We recognise that basis risk is an important issue. There will be a requirement under 
Solvency II for annuity companies to hold capital to cover basis risk where they have 
a hedging instrument that is not perfect. However, given that no longevity bonds have 
yet been issued, no annuity provider has been in a position to agree the scale of capital 
required with its regulator. The level of capital will clearly depend on the composition 
and size of the insurer’s annuity population. However, reinsurers who are also caught 
by Solvency II would be more able to consolidate exposure by pooling portfolios 
from different providers and therefore suffer less basis risk. It is possible that 
reinsurers could end up using longevity bonds to manage their longevity risk and 
reduce their Solvency II capital requirement, whilst providing indemnity rather than 
indexed solutions to insurers with small pools of annuities. 
 
Whilst it is hard to be absolutely sure at this stage in the development of the market, 
we do not believe that basis risk means that longevity bonds will be ineffective. Basis 
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risk arises in other markets where imperfect hedging instruments are used, such as 
interest rate and currency futures contracts. Using these contracts leads to both 
contemporaneous and time basis risk, but this does not prevent them from providing 
highly effective – if not perfect – hedges as was discussed in detail in Blake et al. 
(2006). 
 
XI. Next Step 
 
If we accept that longevity bonds have a potentially important role to play in hedging 
systematic longevity risk, then the next step is for governments in countries with 
significant private sector pension funds to set up a working party to undertake a cost-
benefit analysis of government issuance of longevity bonds to help manage the 
associated longevity risk exposure. The terms of reference of this working party 
should cover the benefits that would accrue, the scale of the longevity risk that 
governments would be assuming, and the actions governments can take to mitigate 
this risk. The working party should also work through the practicalities of issuing 
longevity bonds, including the construction of reference longevity indices, potential 
demand, pricing, liquidity and taxation.60
 
 
Appendix A: A Brief Guide to Solvency II 
 
Solvency II is similar to the banks’ regulatory regime Basel II, and its purpose is to 
align regulatory capital more closely with economic capital. It is due to come into 
force in all member states of the European Union in 2014, having already been 
delayed several times. 
 
The European Commission’s Solvency II initiative to improve the regulation of 
European insurance companies started in 2000. Its aim is to ensure improved risk 
management and greater consistency in the calculation of capital requirements across 
European insurers.  
 
                                                 
60
 Longevity bonds are annuity bonds with the coupon payment involving a return of capital element as 
well as an interest element. The tax treatment will therefore be more complicated than with a 
conventional bond. 
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The capital that needs to be held under the current Solvency I framework is calculated 
using simple formulae which result in different levels of prudence for different 
insurance products and even different portfolios within product categories. As a 
result, it is difficult to compare the financial strength of European insurers. 
 
Under Solvency II, Insurers will be required to hold a minimum Solvency Capital 
Requirement (SCR) which is calculated to ensure that the firm holds sufficient capital 
to cover against adverse events occurring over the next year with a probability of 
99.5%.  
 
The use of a one-year value-at-risk measure reflects a desire by EU regulators for 
consistency with the Basel capital adequacy regime for banks, although many 
insurance experts would argue that this is flawed given the long-term and different 
nature of insurance liabilities. 
 
Insurance firms can either use Standard Formulae or develop their own Internal 
Models to calculate their SCR. Both methodologies require the firms to use 
assumptions set by the EU regulator regarding the valuations of assets and liabilities. 
To ensure consistency and maximum harmonisation across EU member states, 
national regulators will have the responsibility to ensure that their insurers use the 
final EU-wide standardised assumptions and methodologies.   
 
The objective of the Solvency II valuation approach is to enhance comparability and 
transparency across European insurers. The Committee of European Insurance and 
Occupational Pension Supervisors (CEIOPS) has been advising on the development 
of common Solvency II risk margin calculation methodology and assumptions. This 
has proved to be a difficult and contentious task given the diversity of products and 
current practices across member states and there are still a number of unanswered 
issues particularly concerning annuity business. 
 
Where possible a mark-to-market approach is used. However, if there is no deep and 
liquid financial market resulting in risks that are non-hedgeable then a mark-to-model 
approach is used. Longevity risk is currently deemed to be non-hedgeable. 
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The calculation of the risk margin for a non-hedgeable risk is based on the cost-of-
capital (CoC) method, with CoC defined as the cost of holding sufficient capital 
consistent with projected future SCRs to support the business. Under the CoC 
approach, the CoC charge in every period should be calculated by multiplying the 
projected capital requirement in respect of non-hedgeable risk capital by a predefined 
CoC rate. This is the philosophy we have attempted to mirror in calculating the 
longevity bond prices in Section VII. However as this CoC approach requires 
complex multi-year risk modelling, it is expected that some simplification will be 
allowed under Solvency II. The proposed Solvency II CoC of 6% above the risk free 
rate has also been challenged by the Chief Risk Officers’ Forum61
 
  
 and others. 
A firm date for the introduction of Solvency II has still not been finally fixed and 
there are still a number of uncertainties particularly for annuity providers around the 
allowance for illiquidity premiums and future longevity risks. 
 
Finally, it is important to reiterate that our proposal for governments to issue 
longevity bonds is not primarily a response to Solvency II in the EU. Our key 
argument is that longevity risk is an inter-generational risk that requires governments 
in all countries to help to manage.  
 
Appendix B: The Cairns-Blake-Dowd Model 
 
The Cairns-Blake-Dowd (CBD) (2006) model is a two-parameter stochastic mortality 
model that fits the logit of the mortality rate to the two factors as follows: 
 
 
(1) (1) (2) (2)( , )logit( ( , )) log
1 ( , ) x t x t
q t xq t x
q t x
β κ β κ = = + −   
where q(t, x) is the mortality rate at time t and at age x, ( )itκ is the ith time-varying 
factor that drives the dynamics of mortality rates, and ( )i
xβ  is the ith age-related weight 
on ( )itκ . The CBD model adopts very simple parametric forms for the age-related 
weights: 
                                                 
61
 See Appendix C for further information on the C-o-C Method 
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(1) 1xβ =  
(2) ( )x x xβ = −  
 
where 1 iix n x
−= ∑ is the mean age in the sample range and n is the length of the 
sample range. This particular parameterization means that the first time-varying factor 
influences the level of the mortality term structure at time t, while the second 
influences the slope.  
 
A number of studies have shown that the CBD model fits mortality rate data well at 
high ages (above 50) in terms of goodness-of-fit, backtesting and the generation of 
mortality density forecasts (see, e.g., Cairns et al. (2009, 2011) and Dowd et al. 
(2010a,b).   
 
Appendix C: The Cost-of-Capital Method and a Justification for the Cost-of-
Capital Assumptions used to Price the Longevity Bond 
 
Our model for pricing longevity bonds makes use of the ‘cost-of-capital’ method 
outlined in the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) Forum’s (2008) report ‘Market Value of 
Liabilities for Insurance Firms – Implementing Elements for Solvency II’. This report 
addressed both core principles and practical issues relating to the calculation of the 
market value of liabilities under Solvency II. 
 
By the ‘cost of capital’ (CoC), we mean the cost above the risk free rate. As shown in 
Table 4, the CoC can be expressed as a risk premium above or as a reduction in yield 
from the risk free rate. We can interpret the CoC as the longevity risk premium 
demanded by government to ensure inter-generational fairness, as discussed in 
Section V.C.  
 
The CRO Forum sought advice from Dr Philipp Keller of Ernst & Young and 
Professors Shaun Wang and Richard Phillips of Georgia State University concerning 
the calibration of the CoC. The resulting 2008 report concluded (pages 8 and 18): 
“Research commissioned by the CRO Forum suggests that a suitable range for the 
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cost of capital rate is 2.5% - 4.5% per annum. This rate is intended to be applied to an 
Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) calibrated to a 99.5% confidence interval over a 
one year time horizon.” Figure 1 on page 30 of the report shows the CoC rate as a 
function of confidence level in the base case that they assumed: “It can be seen that 
the CoC rate reduces as the level of capitalisation increases, reaching a level of COC 
(99.99%) = 2.6% for AAA-rated companies.”  
 
The CRO Forum’s base case also assumed a risk free rate of 4%, hence our use of this 
rate in our study. Figure 6 in the CRO report on page 35 shows the sensitivity of the 
cost of capital as a function of the confidence level for a range of risk free rates.  An 
8% risk free rate suggests a 3.5% CoC, a 5% risk free rate a 2.5% CoC, and a 2% risk 
free rate a 2% CoC, all at the 99.99% one year confidence level. 
 
The CRO Forum’s analysis of and charts on The CoC lend support for our decision to 
show the longevity bond pricing at COCs of 2% and 3%, particularly when we are 
calculating capital at the 99.95% one year confidence level. The quantum of economic 
capital at this level is much higher than at the 99.5% level which is consistent with the 
use of a lower cost of capital. 
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